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9.1  Introduction 
Foreign investment plays an increasingly significant role in the U.S. labor 
market. By 1992, foreign investment provided more than 5 percent of all U.S. 
employment,  although  there was  significant  variation  among the  different 
states. For example, as table 9.1 indicates, while foreign employment repre- 
sented almost 12 percent of all employment in Delaware and Hawaii, in Mon- 
tana and South Dakota it accounted for little more than 2 percent of employees. 
Foreign investment is often seen as desirable for its employment benefits alone. 
However, it is widely believed that foreign investment may provide other ad- 
vantages such as knowledge spillovers to host locations as well.’ In this con- 
text, it is not surprising that state governments  during the 1980s intensified 
their efforts to capture a larger fraction of these new investments. It is natural 
to ask how successful these states were in altering investment outcomes. It is 
also important to ask how this investment responded to differences in factor 
market conditions both across the nation and within regions. 
The responsiveness of foreign investment to differences in tax and promo- 
tion policies intranationally as well as internationally, however, remains a mat- 
ter of debate. Uncertainty arises in part from the number of ways to measure 
the volume of foreign  investment. Measures include capital  investment, the 
number of new plant investments, and the new employment generated. The 
more important reason for uncertainty is the difficulty of measuring and char- 
acterizing  the significance of fiscal and promotion  policies. While one may 
readily observe the existence of various investment inducements, it is difficult 
to provide an accurate view of the magnitude of the benefits conferred by these 
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285 Table 9.1  Growth in Foreign Employment by State, 1980-92 
Foreign 
1992 Employment”  Percentageb 
1980-92 
State  Foreign  us.  1980  1992  Percentage Change‘ 
Total 
Connecticut 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
mode  Island 
Vermont 
Delaware 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Michigan 
Ohio 
Wisconsin 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Florida 
Georgia 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Arizona 
New Mexico 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Colorado 
Idaho 
Montana 
Utah 
Wyoming 
4,705.5 
81.7 
24.1 
113.6 
27.7 
12.3 
7.5 
35.8 
74.8 
216.3 
340 
215.3 
246.4 
126.2 
140.4 
2 12.6 
81.8 
32.6 
27.4 
94.1 
77.2 
16 
5.3 
5.8 
60.7 
30.8 
194.9 
154.3 
69.4 
62. I 
23.8 
191.3 
111.1 
121.7 
119.9 
34.1 
52.6 
13.6 
43.8 
324.4 
61 
13.5 
5.4 
22.7 
5.5 
93,022 
1,354 
428 
2,508 
427 
376 
212 
302 
1,727 
2,962 
6,552 
4,496 
4,575 
2,226 
3,394 
4,228 
2,052 
1,062 
926 
1,896 
2,025 
626 
217 
248 
1,380 
815 
4,666 
2,5 I8 
1,260 
1,325 
77  I 
2,698 
1,267 
1,933 
2.32 I 
510 
1,298 
462 
980 
6,090 
1.355 
344 
254 
63  8 
I54 
2.08 
2.36 
3.15 
1.79 
2.85 
1.62 
2.77 
3.29 
2.10 
3.67 
2.41 
2.3 1 
2.22 
2.00 
1.74 
1.85 
2.78 
I .5 
1.28 
1.64 
1.44 
0.72 
0.88 
0.37 
1.5 
1.69 
1.65 
2.89 
1.67 
2.41 
1.02 
2.59 
4.1 I 
2.3 
1.58 
2.75 
1.29 
1.4 
1.5 
2.16 
1.46 
0.97 
0.55 
I .62 
1.38 
5.06 
6.03 
5.63 
4.53 
6.49 
3.27 
3.54 
11.9 
4.33 
7.30 
5.19 
4.79 
5.39 
5.67 
4.14 
5.03 
3.99 
3.07 
2.96 
4.96 
3.81 
2.56 
2.44 
2.34 
4.4 
3.78 
4.18 
6.13 
5.5 I 
4.69 
3.09 
7.09 
8.77 
6.30 
5.17 
6.69 
4.05 
2.94 
4.47 
5.33 
4.50 
3.92 
2.13 
3.56 
3.57 
2.98 
3.67 
2.48 
2.14 
3.64 
1.65 
0.77 
8.56 
2.23 
3.63 
2.78 
2.48 
3.17 
3.67 
2.4 
3.18 
1.21 
1.57 
1.68 
3.32 
2.37 
1.84 
I .56 
I .97 
2.9 
2.09 
2.53 
3.24 
3.84 
2.28 
2.07 
4.5 
4.66 
4 
3.59 
3.94 
2.76 
1.54 
2.97 
3.17 
3.04 
2.95 
1.58 
1.94 
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Table 9.1  (continued) 
Foreign 
1992 Employment”  Percentageb 
1980-92 
State  Foreign  us.  1980  1992  Percentage Changec 
California  521.8  10,614  2.06  4.92  2.86 
Nevada  23  576  1.15  3.99  2.84 
Oregon  43  1,063  0.90  4.05  3.15 
Washington  78.7  1,870  1.18  4.21  3.03 
Alaska 
Hawaii 
9.7  179  5.05  5.42  0.37 
53  45 1  3.74  11.7  8.01 
~  ~~~ 
Source; Data are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis benchmark surveys. 
aNumber of employees in thousands. 
hForeign  percentage of overall employment in each state. 
cPercentage change in state employment that is provided by  foreign affiliates. 
programs. Finally, the implementation of programs is not exogenous. Hence, 
in determining the value of a new program, further analysis of the governmen- 
tal unit is important. 
This study examines U.S.  state employment data between  the years  1980 
and 1992 to determine the effect of state policies on the interstate distribution 
of employment by foreign firms. The focus on employment is motivated in part 
by  the fact that little work to date has examined the role of fiscal policies in 
changing the distribution of foreign employment. In addition, since many state 
policies are justified by their positive employment effects, it is important to 
assess the significance of these claims. 
Two tools are used to identify the effect of state policies on foreign employ- 
ment. First, contrary to most treatments of investment, this paper does not as- 
sume that all states are equal competitors for foreign investment. Instead, states 
are assumed to compete most intensely with their neighbors. In other words, 
there should be a higher degree of substitutability among states within a region 
than between states located in different regions of the United States. Therefore, 
tax  and factor market variables are measured relative  to each state’s region 
rather than  to the nation  as a whole. Second, foreign firms operating in the 
United States ultimately face one of two different tax treatments of their U.S.- 
based income when they repatriate their U.S.  earnings to their home countries. 
The implication of this treatment dichotomy  is that some countries will re- 
spond more vigorously to interstate tax differences than others. This dichot- 
omy will be used as a further discriminant in testing for fiscal effects2 
The findings of  this paper are as follows. Tax effects are not apparent in the 
2. This method is introduced in the context of  state data by Hines (1996). which studies cross- 
sectional data on foreign plant, property, and equipment in 1987. In contrast, this paper will study 
panel data concerning foreign employment. 288  Deborah L. Swenson 
employment of all nonbank foreign affiliates. However, tax effects are evident 
once the focus of attention is shifted to foreign  manufacturing  employment. 
Presumably, manufacturing  employment is more responsive  to interregional 
tax differences since proximity to final markets is less important than it is for 
nonmanufacturing  activity. Further controls for tax system differences facing 
investors of different nationalities indicate that the intraregional distribution of 
investment is affected by state taxes. In contrast, state promotion efforts, such 
as the opening of state investment promotion offices overseas, provide no mea- 
surable stimulus to foreign investment. The failure to identify a significant ef- 
fect for state promotion efforts may arise for any of a number of reasons. It is 
possible that the interstate subtleties of these state efforts are not easily cap- 
tured by indicator variables that denote their presence. On the other hand, some 
states may implement such programs precisely because they are attempting to 
overcome intrinsic disadvantages in attracting investment. For example, a state 
whose industrial base has recently deteriorated may institute new policies that 
succeed in attracting new investment. The effects may not be readily apparent, 
however, since the policy brings the state back to the national average for states 
with similar observable characteristics. In addition, if a state adds a new policy 
tool but it is matched by neighboring states in its region, no net effect may be 
observed. Finally, it must be recognized that investment responds not only to 
tax  and fiscal variables  but  also to nontax  factors that enhance the attrac- 
tiveness of one state over others. It is possible that the lack of  a positive finding 
reflects that fact that foreign investors will not be attracted to a state on the 
basis of information programs unless the state has attractive characteristics. 
The organization  of  this paper is as follows: Section 9.2 describes invest- 
ment incentives and briefly reviews some previous work on the issue. Section 
9.3 provides a model that relates investment decisions to the tax and promotion 
environment. Description  of the data and discussion of relevant employment 
and fiscal trends are presented  in section 9.4. Estimation proceeds in section 
9.5, and section 9.6 concludes. 
9.2  Background on Investment Incentives 
It is natural to expect that, all else equal, increases in state taxes deter invest- 
ment while state investment promotion efforts encourage investment. However, 
much research on state taxation finds that investment is only minimally respon- 
sive to tax p01icy.~  That corporate tax rates or average tax payments are not 
shown to consistently  deter investment may mean  in part  that  the revenues 
collected are used for the provision of infrastructure or services valued by busi- 
3. Carlton (1983) is unable to find any significant evidence that state taxes exerted a negative 
effect on investment. In contrast, Helms (1985) and Wasylenko and McCuire (1985), when looking 
at employment changes, and Bartik (1985) and Papke (1987, 1991), when looking at industry- 
specific effective tax rates, discover significant tax effects. Extensive surveys of previous findings 
are provided by Bartik (1991  j and Wasylenko (1994). 289  Effect of U.S. State Tax and Investment Promotion Policy 
nesses. Nonetheless, numerous states during the 1980s made major changes to 
their tax systems, claiming that they would help to attract and retain investment 
and consequently raise state employment levels. 
More recently, a number of papers have examined the responsiveness of for- 
eign investment to state tax policies. Coughlin, Terza, and Arromdee (1991), 
Woodward (1992), Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman (1992), and Luger 
and Shetty (1985) study international  investment in  U.S. states as it relates 
to state promotion attempts, measured by promotion expenditures, promotion 
offices and unitary taxes, and an effort index. Dynamic aspects of  interstate 
competition are explored in Head, Ries, and Swenson (1994). This paper cre- 
ates investment-specific measures of the fiscal incentives to be gained by in- 
vestors selecting the various states and finds that while state investment promo- 
tion measures increased the investment received by one state over the others, 
in the aggregate states neutralized each other’s efforts through emulation. Ulti- 
mately, states received the same amount of investment that they would have 
received in the absence of all programs. In order to identify the tax sensitivity 
of foreign plant, property, and equipment expenditure, Hines (1996), Slemrod 
(1990),  and  Swenson  (1994)  utilize  investor  nationality  to  determine  the 
strength of  country response to host-country taxation. Hines’s results, which 
consider the interstate distribution of investment, show that states with higher 
taxes attract smaller shares of foreign capital equipment and plant investments. 
In the international context, there is additional work that has examined the 
responsiveness of investment to taxes and factor markets. Wheeler and Mody 
( 1992) study the international location of manufacturing investment and invest- 
ment in the electronics industry. They find that risk and factor conditions, such 
as wage differences across countries, are important determinants of investment 
location. Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) give greater 
attention to tax conditions.  Both studies show that foreign investment is re- 
sponsive to tax differences. The relationship they note is nonlinear, with partic- 
ularly low rates of tax creating the greatest location incentives. 
However, there are a number of advantages to studying the distribution of 
foreign investment within the United States, rather than examining the interna- 
tional distribution of investment. To begin with, since almost all states use the 
federal method for calculating corporate income, the computation of profits by 
state is less complicated than the calculation of profits across countries. After 
the computation of profit, each state assesses corporate income taxes on this 
profit according to apportionment formulas that seek to determine how activi- 
ties in that state contributed to the firm’s overall  profit^.^ In contrast, a firm’s 
international tax payments are based on the profits it is deemed to have earned 
in various countries. In this context, differences in tax rates can create incen- 
tives to shift income between country jurisdictions for tax purposes as a means 
4. The most common apportionment formula gives a one-third weight to payroll, sales, and 
capital. However, in recent years some states are increasing the relative weight placed on sales. 290  Deborah L. Swenson 
of reducing a foreign firm’s tax liability for a given amount of real activity. For 
example, a multinational can, subject to some limitations, use the location of 
its financing to affect the amount of profit that is deemed earned and taxable in 
different locations. In marked contrast, a multinational operating in the United 
States cannot alter the amounts it pays to New Jersey versus Kansas, for ex- 
ample, by  choosing different  states for its debt or equity finance. A second 
advantage to the study of interstate tax differences  is that interstate tax pay- 
ments are not subject to the same timing issues that are present in the payment 
of international taxes. Foreign firms tend to become liable for home taxes when 
they repatriate income from host locations to the home country. As a result, it 
is financial movements, rather than income earning, that triggers tax payments. 
In the case of state taxes, taxes are based on current-year profits, rather than 
the timing of intrafirm financial flows that move across borders. 
9.3  A Model of Investment 
The objective of this paper is to determine the responsiveness of the inter- 
state distribution  of foreign employment to wage  and fiscal differences  be- 
tween the states. In order to model this decision, we begin with the assumption 
that foreign firms distribute a fixed amount of new employment, L, across U.S. 
~tates.~  From the perspective  of each individual  firm  i, labor is allocated to 
U.S. states in a fashion that maximizes the firm’s overall U.S. profits after tax, 
Profits earned by each firm depend on the vector of factor prices in each state, 
v,,  a vector of each state’s tax and promotion efforts, T~,  and finally a vector of 
final goods prices, p,.  This profit function governs how much labor, Lr,  the firm 
deploys in each state. Changes in labor demand can now be written as 
AL,  = C PI * Avsl  + y  * Ap,  + 6*   AT^ 
I 
However, since we are examining the geographic distribution of investment, 
we will now rewrite equation (2)  in a way  that characterizes changes of em- 
ployment in state s, relative to overall foreign employment in the United States. 
It is assumed that there is a single price for final output on national markets, 
allowing us to remove the price term, Apr: 
(3)  A(L,/L) =  P,v*A(ws/w)  + ~*A(T~/T). 
Each of  the terms in equation (3) represents the change in the variable in a 
particular state relative to the average change across all states. Another assump- 
5. As is demonstrated by  Wheeler and Mody (1992), the amount of investment located in the 
United States will depend, in part, on conditions in the United States relative to other countries. 
However, we assume that the distribution of  investment within the United States is unaffected by 
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tion that is implicit in equation (3) is that the only factor price that is relevant 
to the demand for labor is the wage by  state. Because the capital market is 
assumed to operate at the national level, market integration implies that firms 
will not face interstate differences in the cost of capital. Since it is unlikely 
that labor markets are integrated to the same degree, the same is not assumed 
to be true of labor markets. Variants of equation (3) will be used as the basis 
for estimation. 
However, further explanation  of the tax coefficient  is required. First,  the 
notion that a state will receive less foreign employment if it raises its corporate 
taxes relative to other states is based on two factors. Naturally, a higher corpo- 
rate tax rate will subject firms operating in state s to the direct effect of lower 
after-tax profits. In addition, almost all states use apportionment formulas to 
determine what fraction of a firm’s U.S. earnings will be subject to corporate 
tax in that state. Each state collects taxes on accounting profits, II;,  that are 
usually calculated in a similar manner for all states. Total state taxes owed by 
each firm, Taxi, are then determined as follows: 
(4) 
The tax collected by each state is determined by the state’s tax rate and by its 
apportionment formula. The apportionment formula determines the taxation of 
a firm’s income according to a set of weights, 8, that are typically based on the 
firm’s employment payroll, L, capital stock, K, and sales, S, within the state. 
The weights sum to one: O,,  + OJK + 8,,  = 1. As a result, if a firm increases its 
employment in a state, it increases the income that is subject to tax within that 
state. This factor  creates an additional  deterrent  to placing  employment in 
higher tax states.6 
9.4  Data and Foreign Employment Trends 
Between the Commerce Department benchmark  surveys of foreign invest- 
ment conducted in 1980 and 1992, employment by foreign nonbank affiliates 
in the United States more than doubled. Foreign nonbank  affiliates provided 
slightly more than 2 million jobs in 1980. The number had risen to 4.7 million 
by  1992. Tables 9.2A and 9.2B provide further snapshots of foreign employ- 
ment in the years 1980 and 1992, including a state and country breakdown of 
that employment. It is interesting to note that the rate of growth within a state 
is not uniform across investors. In part, these differences probably reflect the 
relative industry strengths of the investors of different nationalities. 
This study uses  employment  data from these benchmark  surveys for the 
6. In recent years some states have worked to mitigate this disincentive to employment by chang- 
ing the weights of their apportionment formulas to weight sales more heavily and the payroll and 
capital factors less heavily. Table 9.2A  Distribution of Employment across States, by Country, 1980 
Country 
State  Canada  France  Germany  Netherlands  Switzerland  United Kingdom  Japan  Total 
Total 
Connecticut 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
Vermont 
Delaware 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Michigan 
Ohio 
Wisconsin 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
290  206.3 
2.3  4.4 
6.8 
6  1.9 
2.6  1.6 
0.5  0.5 
1.5 
0.5 
9  7.3 
5.2  1 1.4 
21.4  18.7 
13  12.9 
16.8  6.9 
5.7  5.5 
16  10.1 
9  13.2 
11.4  10.7 
6  0.7 
1.6  2.8 
14.3  I .7 
6.6  1.1 
0.8 
1.3  0.03 
0.5 
375.9 
5.8 
10.3 
2.5 
1.3 
0.9 
8.3 
26.8 
23.3 
31.8 
17 
12.4 
13.2 
15.6 
7.2 
2.6 
3.1 
3.8 
6.6 
0.04 
186.7 
0.5 
2.2 
0.7 
0.01 
3.3 
9.6 
10.9 
2.9 
11 
9.2 
2.4 
4 
4.1 
1.3 
0.7 
1.3 
2.3 
0.3 
157.8 
1.9 
1.8 
0.984 
1.7 
0.02 
2.4 
21.1 
19.7 
8 
16.2 
2.7 
2.9 
12.3 
2.9 
1.6 
0.4 
2.6 
2.6 
1.3 
0.02 
0.03 
428.2 
13.5 
1 
13.8 
1.5 
2 
0.1 
5.3 
5.4 
22.4 
44.8 
31.7 
24.9 
6.9 
13.5 
23.9 
18.7 
5.4 
2.9 
5.8 
5.4 
1 
0.08 
0.3 
115.3 
0.1 
0.08 
0.8 
0.04 
0.006 
1.3 
7.1 
10.9 
2.2 
8.1 
1 
2.8 
1.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.1 
0.4 
0.7 
2,033.9 
34.9 
14.5 
47.9 
12.3 
6.9 
6.3 
8.7 
40.9 
120.5 
179.3 
114.6 
112.4 
47.3 
65.3 
84.2 
58.8 
19.6 
13.8 
30.9 
30.3 
5.2 
2.4 
1.1 Alabama 
Arkansas 
Florida 
Georgia 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Arizona 
New Mexico 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Colorado 
Idaho 
Montana 
Utah 
Wyoming 
California 
Nevada 
Oregon 
Washington 
Alaska 
Hawaii 
2.9 
1.5 
7.7 
10.4 
5.2 
4.9 
2.1 
11.1 
3 
3.9 
3 
6 
3.1 
1.8 
2.7 
16.2 
4.6 
0.7 
0.6 
1.6 
1.4 
25.6 
0.9 
2.2 
4.2 
0.8 
0.8 
3.4 
2 
9.8 
7.1 
1.1 
2.2 
0.9 
4.5 
8.9 
3.5 
4.5 
1 
0.7 
0.1 
1.6 
12.1 
2.8 
0.3 
0.5 
14.8 
0.5 
1.9 
2.5 
2.8 
1.2 
11.9 
8.1 
5.1 
8.8 
1.8 
12.6 
11 
4.6 
8.1 
3.3 
4.4 
2.3 
5.5 
29.8 
3.3 
0.08 
0.3 
1.5 
0.3 
44.9 
0.9 
2.1 
3.6 
0.005 
1.3 
2.9 
6.2 
8.5 
0.8 
8.7 
10.3 
12.5 
2.1 
0.3 
21.8 
1 
21.7 
0.02 
0.6 
1.2 
0.08 
1.9 
0.5 
4.1 
2.1 
0.5 
2 
0.9 
3.1 
2.5 
5.8 
3 
0.2 
0.6 
0.07 
1.4 
7.3 
1 
0.2 
0.1 
11.3 
0.1 
0.5 
2.2 
0.006 
0.09 
6.3 
4.8 
14.4 
15 
5.9 
6.7 
L 
17.5 
10.3 
7.4 
11.5 
2 
1.6 
1.9 
3 
19.2 
4.1 
0.9 
0.09 
0.6 
0.2 
32.7 
0.7 
1.2 
3.3 
0.5 
2 
5 
0.4 
0.4 
0.2 
0.8 
2.6 
1.6 
0.7 
0.3 
0.02 
0.2 
4. I 
0.4 
0.04 
0.07 
0.04 
34.8 
2.6 
4.6 
9 
22.7 
14.8 
65.9 
67.4 
23.2 
39.6 
9.5 
67.5 
54.2 
44.1 
37.2 
19 
14.4 
7.1 
19.4 
136.1 
19.9 
3.7 
1.8 
9.5 
3 
219.6 
4.6 
10.2 
21.1 
8.3 
15.5 
Note; Table reports numbers of employees in thousands. The “total” column may contain a number higher than the sum of the country columns because the “total” 
column includes foreign employment from countries not listed individually. Table 9.2B  Distribution of  Employment across States, by Country, 1992 
Country 
State  Canada  France  Germany  Netherlands  Switzerland  United Kingdom  Australia  Japan  Total 
Total 
Connecticut 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
Vermont 
Delaware 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Michigan 
Ohio 
Wisconsin 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
587.9 
6.4 
11 
14.9 
7.5 
1.8 
2.4 
17.5 
12 
19.2 
41.1 
25 
27 
13.7 
19.9 
16.6 
12.8 
5.8 
6.2 
10.7 
16.1 
1.5 
1.8 
1.5 
358.7 
8.7 
0.9 
11.3 
I .5 
0.4 
0.5 
0.5 
6.6 
16 
28.6 
21.3 
13.3 
15.6 
10 
15.9 
5.3 
3.4 
2.6 
3.4 
6.7 
1.8 
0.8 
0.1 
5 19.5 
13.9 
0.9 
11.1 
3 
I .9 
0.8 
I .3 
8.1 
29 
39 
30.8 
26.6 
12.8 
23.3 
15.7 
15 
3.4 
2.6 
12.7 
6.8 
3.1 
0.2 
0.7 
306.1 
14.1 
1.3 
3.4 
1.2 
0.6 
0.4 
0.6 
7.2 
13.9 
31.4 
20.8 
14.3 
9.5 
4.2 
15.5 
8.5 
2.6 
1.6 
5.3 
4.6 
1.2 
0.3 
0.9 
295.1 
6.9 
0.7 
5.3 
1.2 
I .4 
1.1 
0.5 
5.8 
27.7 
21 
8.8 
27.2 
4.9 
4.5 
16.7 
8.3 
1.7 
2.2 
6.1 
6.6 
1.3 
0.  I 
0.1 
961.4 
16.7 
5.3 
34.7 
8.2 
4.4 
0.8 
5.1 
13.6 
40.5 
81.6 
58.6 
53 
17.7 
25.4 
52.1 
15.9 
6.2 
6.1 
19.4 
15.9 
3.7 
I .4 
0.8 
137.8 
1.2 
0.1 
3.2 
0.8 
0.3 
I .5 
1.6 
4.6 
5.8 
6.4 
1.3 
9.5 
1.7 
1.8 
0.1 
0.5 
17.5 
1.1 
0.4 
0.1 
728.2 
5.1 
0.8 
1.8 
0.7 
1 
0.8 
7.8 
31.6 
45.1 
16.1 
46.2 
32 
3 
46.7 
4 
3.2 
2.4 
5.2 
6.9 
I .4 
0.8 
0.4 
13 
1,705.5 
81.7 
24.1 
113.6 
27.7 
12.3 
7.5 
35.8 
74.8 
216.3 
340 
215.3 
246.4 
126.2 
140.4 
2 12.6 
81.8 
32.6 
27.4 
94.1 
77.2 
16 
5.3 
5.8 Alabama 
Arkansas 
Florida 
Georgia 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Arizona 
New Mexico 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Colorado 
Idaho 
Montana 
Utah 
Wyoming 
California 
Nevada 
Oregon 
Washington 
Alaska 
Hawaii 
7.6 
5.8 
20.4 
21.2 
10.7 
10 
4.3 
29 
8.4 
16.9 
15.3 
7.1 
10.2 
1.3 
1.7 
2.4 
0.6 
1.3 
1.7 
2.4 
0.6 
35.9 
4.9 
4.1 
8.9 
1.8 
0.5 
12.8 
2.7 
18 
12.7 
4.7 
3.6 
2.2 
14 
15 
9.6 
8.5 
2.1 
3.9 
1.2 
5.4 
23.2 
3.6 
0.4 
0.3 
0.7 
1.3 
31.2 
0.7 
I .4 
2.9 
0.1 
0.6 
4 
0.9 
18.1 
13.1 
7.9 
7 
2.3 
29.5 
17.4 
7.3 
15.1 
7.1 
3.3 
2.4 
2.5 
26.7 
5.5 
7.5 
0.6 
3.8 
0.7 
48.1 
2.8 
9.4 
11.2 
0.1 
0.5 
I .6 
1.8 
9.6 
10.4 
2.4 
7.3 
0.7 
6.7 
18.3 
6.2 
4.9 
2.8 
1.7 
1.5 
1.8 
22.4 
2.9 
0.2 
0.2 
1.4 
0.4 
27.3 
2.9 
0.9 
3.7 
0.5 
0.8 
4.2 
1.7 
8.3 
10.1 
1.8 
2.6 
2.7 
12.6 
5.1 
6.9 
5.7 
3.2 
2 
0.3 
1.1 
16.5 
4.3 
1 
0.2 
1.5 
28.9 
0.3 
1.5 
5.8 
0.2 
1.6 
8.8 
4.4 
42.7 
34.5 
12.8 
11.6 
3.8 
43 
14 
30.7 
23.3 
7 
7.8 
1.9 
7.1 
66.5 
11 
2.8 
0.9 
6 
1.5 
97.5 
2.9 
6.1 
13.1 
2.5 
1.1 
1.9 
1.4 
4.8 
5.3 
1.2 
1 
1 
1.6 
0.6 
4.7 
0.6 
17.5 
1.8 
0.4 
9.1 
1.5 
0.1 
0.8 
0.3 
17.3 
1.9 
I .2 
3.5 
0.4 
3.3 
7.8 
4.9 
22.1 
21 
19.1 
2.3 
2 
13.3 
11.7 
20.3 
15 
I .9 
7.5 
1.8 
4 
33.8 
7.9 
0.2 
0.3 
1.9 
147.9 
4.4 
12.2 
16.9 
2.6 
35.7 
60.7 
30.8 
194.9 
154.3 
69.4 
62.1 
23.8 
191.3 
111.1 
121.7 
119.9 
34.1 
52.6 
13.6 
43.8 
324.4 
61 
13.5 
5.4 
22.7 
5.5 
521.8 
23 
43 
78.7 
9.7 
53 
Note: Table reports numbers of employees in thousands. The “total” column may contain a number higher than the sum of the country columns because the “total” 
column includes foreign employment from countries not listed individually. 296  Deborah L. Swenson 
analysis in section 9.5.’ Although employment data are available on an annual 
basis, the dependent variables used in the next section measure the change in 
employment between the 1980 and 1987 surveys and the change between the 
1987 and 1992 surveys. There are a number of reasons for looking at the data 
at this lower frequency. First, we assume that foreign employment will adjust 
to changes in the fiscal and factor environments with a lag. Since it is not clear 
how long the lags should be, and it is not clear that the rate of adjustment to 
factor markets is the same as it is to fiscal changes, we examine the changes 
over longer time frames. Second, mergers and acquisitions were a large com- 
ponent of foreign investment expenditures, especially in the late 1980s. Many 
of these mergers were large, involving the acquisition of control over large 
labor forces, some of which might be reduced in subsequent selloffs. By look- 
ing at lower frequency data, we intend to capture a smoother picture of trends 
in foreign employment. The statistics that are of most importance to this study 
are those detailing investment at the state level, disaggregated by the country 
of investor origin. 
The data on state fiscal characteristics and on policy changes are collected 
from a number of sources. Fiscal policies were first identified with the aid of 
the Directory of  Incentives for Business Investment and Development in the 
United States (National Association of State Development Agencies [NASDA] 
1991). Next, data on state characteristics  and on state fiscal collections  and 
expenditures were added from Census Bureau collections. Finally, the timing 
of changes in fiscal policies were identified through the periodical Site Selec- 
tion. 
At first glance, the fiscal environment is notable for its stability. Table 9.3A 
presents information on some variables of interest. For example, the range of 
corporate tax rates remained virtually unchanged over the 1982-90 period. The 
average state tax rate on corporate income did rise, but only from 6.36 to 6.7 1 
percent. But these averages obscure some of the activity that was taking place 
during this interval. As table 9.3B demonstrates, though the average corporate 
tax rate changed only slightly, 18 states raised their rates while 7 states lowered 
theirs. The simultaneous changes in opposing directions mean that relative cor- 
porate taxes across states were changing and can be used to examine invest- 
ment decisions. 
A second tax of interest is the sales and use tax rate on manufacturing inputs. 
This tax applies to firm purchases of inputs, whether sourced from within or 
outside of the state of operation, and can lead to a significant increase in the 
cost of materials. Concern over this factor caused the state average sales and 
use tax on manufacturing inputs to be reduced by almost a third, from 1.89 to 
1.27 percent (table 9.3A). State differences in the treatment of sales and use 
tax on manufacturing inputs are further captured in table 9.3B. Half of all states 
7. U.S. Department  of  Commerce  (1985, 1990, 1994). Data  are studied  from  the reported 
samples of all nonbank affiliates and of manufacturing affiliates. 297  Effect of US.  State Tax and Investment Promotion Policy 
Table 9.3A  National Summary Statistics on State Taxes and Promotion Variables 
Variable  1982  1990 
Corporate tax rates (%) 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Average 
Standard deviation 
inputs (a) 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Average 
Standard deviation 
(number of states) 
R&D tax credit 
Investment tax credit 
Sales and use tax rates on manufacturing 
State corporate income tax provisions" 
0.0  0.0 
12.0  12.0 
6.36  6.71 
2.84  2.80 
0.0  0.0 
7.5  6.0 
1.89  1.27 
2.62  2.03 
12  17 
16  17 
Source: NASDA (1991). 
Note: Calculations are based on all 50 states. 
"Not  all states that offered a provision in 1982 continued to offer it in 1990. 
Table 9.3B  National Summary Statistics on Changes in State Fiscal 
Offerings, 1982-90 
Change"  Number of States 
Corporate tax rates 
States raising their corporate tax rates 
States lowering their corporate tax rates 
States with no corporate tax 
States raising their sales tax rates 
States lowering their sales tax rates 
States lowering their taxes on manufacturing inputs 
States with no sales tax on manufacturing inputs 
States raising their sales tax rates that exempted sales of 
Sales and use tax rates on manufacturing inputs 
manufacturing inputs 
18 
7 
4 
25 
0 
7 
21 
6 
Source; NASDA (1991). 
Nore: Calculations are based on all 50 states. 
'Changes are based on comparison of 1990 and 1982 statistics. 
raised their sales taxes on general sales. At the same time 21 states levied no 
sales and use tax on manufacturing  inputs. Of those states that raised their 
sales taxes, almost one-fourth exempted manufacturing inputs from these in- 
creases. The pattern of changes in sales tax rates generally, and in sales and 
use tax rates on manufacturing inputs specifically, is consistent with a policy 298  Deborah L. Swenson 
that taxes less elastic sales activity at a higher rate than more elastic manufac- 
turing activity, which can avoid the tax by moving to another location. 
Another characteristic of the 1980s evidenced in Site Selection is that states 
changed the activities they targeted most directly. High technology  was cited 
as a sector that states wished to foster, and this was reflected in the adoption 
of R&D credits, raising the number of states offering such credits from 12 to 
17. The number of states offering investment tax credits rose overall from 16 
to 17, but the identity of those states changed. Similarly, although 19 states had 
foreign investment promotion  offices in both  1982 and  1990, the identity  of 
some of  those states changed. Since a number of states opened additional of- 
fices, the number of offices rose from 27 worldwide in 1982 to 45 in 1990. 
A final cut on the data is provided  in table 9.4. Here, fiscal variables  are 
summarized on a regional basis, where the regional classifications conform to 
regional definitions presented  in U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of 
Economic Analysis publications. The corporate tax rate on a regional basis 
ranges from a low of 4.1 percent to a high of 8.83 percent. Although states can 
make slight changes in their definitions of income that could potentially offset 
high tax rates, it appears that this was not the case in practice. The variation in 
corporate taxes collected as a fraction of value added in the region is highly 
correlated with the corporate tax rate. 
Large dispersion is also seen in the rate of sales taxes across regions. How- 
ever, the range of sales and use taxes on manufacturing inputs varies even more 
widely, as some regions, notably the Mideast and Great Lakes, have rates very 
close to zero, while other regions, such as the Far West and Southwest, offer 
no reductions for manufacturing inputs as compared with general sales. Two 
other policies that may be of interest to foreign investors are the availability of 
foreign trade zones and the existence of foreign investment promotion offices. 
Here too, we see great regional heterogeneity. Some regions, such as New En- 
gland, have almost no foreign investment promotion offices, while other re- 
gions, such as the Southeast, average more than one per state. 
Overall, the distribution of these variables across regions suggests that states 
may be competing not with the nation as a whole but with their neighbors. If 
states within a region are more similar, then tax policies that are implemented 
may actually result in the shifting of employment within a region. In contrast, 
tax effects may be much less pronounced among regions, since dissimilar re- 
gions will not be in competition with each other unless massive fiscal efforts 
are used to diffuse the general inclination to select one region over the others 
based on the suitability of factor conditions. 
9.5  Estimation 
In this section we examine the responsiveness of the interstate distribution 
of foreign employment to wage and fiscal differences between the states. The 
dimensions of the geographical responsiveness are tested by two cuts on the Table 9.4  Regional Fiscal Variables, 1991 
Variable  New England  Mideast  Great Lakes  Plains  Southeast  Southwest  Rocky Mountain  Far West 
Corporate tax rate (%) 
Sales tax rate (%) 
Manufacturing sales 
tax rate (%) 
Tax per capita ($) 
Corporate taxNalue 
added (%) 
Foreign offices" 
Foreign trade zones" 
8.83 
(1.34) 
4.58 
(2.53) 
1.25 
(3.06) 
1,192 
(354) 
2.29 
(0.91) 
0.167 
[O-11 
1.5 
[o-31 
8.44 
(0.83) 
5.08 
(2.83) 
0.08 
(0.18) 
1,377 
2.79 
(0.77) 
1.6 
4.6 
[  1-1  21 
(23  1 
LO-41 
5.31 
(2.90) 
5.40 
(0.96) 
0.03 
(0.67) 
1,114 
( 139) 
1.58 
(0.91) 
2.6 
LO-51 
4.2 
[2-71 
7.45 
(3.93) 
5.10 
(0.78) 
I .57 
(2.28) 
1,006 
(248) 
1.91 
(1.10) 
0.57 
10-21 
1.5 
[O-21 
6.35 
(1.35) 
5.19 
(1.11) 
2.19 
(2.93) 
979 
(97) 
I .73 
(0.70) 
1.16 
3.25 
LO-31 
[O-1  01 
7.08 
(2.55) 
2.32 
(2.65) 
2.32 
(2.68) 
1,057 
(178) 
1.89 
(1.98) 
0.5 
[O-21 
7.5 
[  1-22] 
5.01 
(3.04) 
3.66 
(2.38) 
1.80 
(2.49) 
967 
(157) 
2.12 
(1.84) 
0.2 
[O-II 
1  .o 
L0-21 
4.10 
(4.58) 
4.87 
(3.32) 
4.87 
(3.32) 
1,227 
(225) 
1.29 
( 1.79) 
0.25 
4.5 
[2-81 
r0-11 
Nore: Regional groupings are calculated according to the groupings used in US.  Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Economic Analysis publications: New En- 
gland = CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT; Mideast = DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA; Great Lakes = IL, IN, MI, OH, WI; Plains = IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD; Southeast = 
AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, W, Southwest = AZ,  NM, OK, TX; Rocky Mountain = CO, ID, MT, UT,  WY, Far West = CA, NV, OR, WA; 
not included = AK, HI. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
"Average number of facilities by region. Numbers in brackets provide numerical range for the states within each region. 300  Deborah L. Swenson 
data. First, the data are tested to see whether the interregional distribution of 
investment reflects wage and fiscal conditions. Second, the data are examined 
to see whether the intraregional distribution of investment responds to intrare- 
gional  factor and  wage conditions.  Further tests  are then performed to see 
whether different types of foreign investment respond more vigorously  than 
others. In particular, it may be that manufacturing employment exhibits differ- 
ent responsiveness to wage and factor conditions than does other nonbank af- 
filiate investment. This possibility is tested through applications of the tests to 
the subsample of foreign manufacturing employment data. 
9.5.1  The Interregional Employment Distribution of All Nonbank Affiliates 
In order to estimate the responsiveness of investment to differences across 
regions,  comparison  variables  are created that  normalize  the change in  the 
value of a particular  variable in each region  by  the change in that  variable 
nationally. These averages are weighted  by  population  so that the effects of 
small states are not overrepresented in the regional variables. The estimating 
equation takes the following form: 
(5)  A(L,./L)  = a + P,*(w,/w)  + ~*A(T~/T)  + y*(Zr/z) + E~ 
The change in a country’s employment in region  r is related  to changes in 
wages in that region relative to the nation and changes in taxes relative to the 
nation. The change in employment may also be affected by other characteris- 
tics of the region, which are contained in the vector Z. The comparison vari- 
ables differ when interregional employment is being tested as opposed to intra- 
regional  investment. In order to avoid  simultaneity  bias,  the wage  variable 
presented is the relative level of wages across regions rather than the relative 
change in wages across regions. 
It is possible that foreign firms choose the regions in which they will place 
their investments based on interregional differences. This idea is implicit in the 
estimation presented in table 9.5, which measures changes in employment by 
region as a function of the weighted average corporate tax and weighted aver- 
age wage of the region. These changes are measured between the benchmark 
survey years 1980 and 1987 and between 1987 and 1992. Columns (1) and (2) 
test whether employment is proportional to regional activity as measured by 
either population or value added. In either specification these scale variables 
are shown to be highly significant. Column (3) tests whether either of these 
scale factors is more significant as a determinant of the interregional distribu- 
tion of foreign employment. When both measures are included population re- 
mains highly significant while value added loses its significance. This suggests 
that value added entered significantly in specification (2) only because it prox- 
ied for population. 
Specification  (4) augments the regression  with variables representing  the 
weighted average wage in the region and the weighted average corporate tax Table 9.5  Employment Changes across Regions 
Dependent Variable: Change in Foreign Employment by Region 
Variable 
Region population 
Region value added 
Region average wage 
Region average 
corporate tax 
Region change in 
corporate tax 
Region job credit 
programs 
Regional foreign 
investment offices 
0.76  1.17  0.69 
(0.17)  (0.45)  (0.19) 
0.11  -0.08 
(0.03)  (0.08) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.19 
(1.38) 
0.73 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.3  1 
(1.39) 
8.09 
(9.57) 
0.66 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.57 
(1.71) 
1.20 
(3.12) 
0.75 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
4.3 1 
(9.20) 
8.92 
(9.77) 
0.69 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
1.80 
(10.15) 
0.35 
(2.86) 
Adjusted RZ  0.12  0.08  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Regression constant terms not reported. Regional variables are calculated as average of  region. Each regression 
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rate in the region. Contrary to expectation, both variables enter with a positive 
sign, though neither coefficient is significant. While a nonpositive coefficient 
is expected on wages, the positive coefficient on the corporate tax  variable 
could be consistent with the “benefits” view of taxation. As long as the govern- 
ment is providing benefits that are valued by investors, higher corporate taxes 
can be consistent with rising levels of employment in a region. To examine the 
effect of including a specific benefit, regression (5)  adds regional job creation 
credit programs as a variable,  since it is a benefit that one would assume is 
directly related to employment decisions. While the expected positive coeffi- 
cient is found, it is not significant. Moreover, the coefficient on the corporate 
tax rate remains positive. 
Further  specifications  were tested that included benefit  measures  such  as 
investment  tax credits and R&D credits. The results are not displayed  since 
they were as unpromising and insignificant as the result shown in column (5). 
If the benefits view of taxation is driving the insignificant positive coefficient 
found on the regional corporate tax rate, the successful combination of benefits 
is not discernable in this data set. 
Regression (6) examines another variable that might enhance foreign em- 
ployment  in a region, the presence of foreign investment promotion offices. 
We  find a weak positive  correlation between  foreign employment decisions 
and the presence of such offices. 
Finally, regressions (7) and (8) try a different specification of  the corporate 
tax  rate  by  region. Here,  the corporate  tax  rate variable is taken  to be  the 
weighted average change  in the region’s corporate tax rate. The coefficients 
again go against the common presumption  that corporate  tax  increases  de- 
crease employment. However, no conclusions can be drawn, since these esti- 
mates are not statistically  significant. As in the two previous  specifications, 
these regressions are augmented alternatively by a job creation credit variable 
and a foreign investment promotion office variable. The coefficients on these 
variables remain equally insignificant. 
It is too early to draw conclusions from the results in table 9.5. It is clearly 
possible  that taxes  and wages exert a significant  effect on employment and 
that the regressions fail to capture these effects. However, one hypothesis is 
suggested. In particular, it appears that the interregional distribution of all af- 
filiate investment is based purely  on population, and by association ultimate 
product markets. The lack of any decisive effect of  corporate taxes or wages 
on employment may reflect the fact that foreign affiliates locate their employ- 
ment  as a means of  gaining proximity to final markets. If  this proximity  is 
sufficiently valuable, then they will distribute themselves evenly across U.S. 
regions in a fashion that is proportionate to population.* 
8. The proximity arguments made here are similar in character to descriptions of  international 
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9.5.2  The Interregional Employment Distribution of 
Manufacturing Affiliates 
Unless transportation costs are extremely high or customers in final markets 
require frequent changes in product specifications, it is not necessary to locate 
production near final markets. Hence, we repeat the tests that were performed, 
this time on the narrower sample of foreign employment involved in manufac- 
t~ring.~  Since the  1980 benchmark survey does not present foreign employ- 
ment  in  manufacturing,  the  manufacturing  data  examined  span  the  years 
The first three columns of table 9.6 examine whether region size as mea- 
sured by population or value added exerts a significant influence on the level 
of manufacturing employment placed in that region. The value-added variable 
has a positive coefficient but is not significant. The population variable is nega- 
tive and insignificant, alone or in combination with the value-added variable. 
It appears that the location of foreign manufacturing employment within a re- 
gion is not strongly influenced by population or manufacturing density as ex- 
hibited by value added. Regressions (4) and (5)  now augment the specification 
with regional wages and taxes. Column (5) includes country dummies, while 
column (4) does not. The wage variables have a negative coefficient that is not 
significant. Regional variation in corporate tax rates now enters with a negative 
and significant sign. Column (6) measures the corporate tax with its change 
rather than its level, but the change does not enter significantly. 
Finally, columns (7) and (8) include two indicators of state investment pro- 
motion effort. In contrast with the data on all nonbank affiliates, these variables 
enter with negative signs. In the case of the job creation credit program, the 
negative coefficient is significant. Interestingly, at the same time, the measured 
effect of wages in column (7) now approaches marginal significance. One in- 
terpretation would be that states with poor-quality labor forces are more likely 
to adopt job creation programs. The presence of the program provides an indi- 
cator variable for interregional variation in labor quality. Once one controls for 
this quality heterogeneity, it becomes more possible to identify the effects of 
wage variation. 
In summing up, there are two primary differences in the interregional em- 
ployment regressions performed on the manufacturing  subsample relative to 
the full sample of  nonbank affiliates. First, corporate taxes exert an identifiable 
negative effect on manufacturing, but not on overall affiliate activity. This is 
consistent with the previous conjecture that much foreign investment is located 
with proximity to final markets and customers in mind. To the extent that man- 
ufacturing can locate at greater distance from final markets, tax differences 
1987-92. 
9. In aggregate, foreign employment in manufacturing was less than half of total nonbank affil- 
iate employment of foreign firms. Table 9.6  Manufacturing Employment Changes across Regions 
Dependent Variable: Change in Foreign Employment by  Region 
Region population 
Region value added 
Region average wage 
Region average 
corporate tax 
Region change in 
corporate tax 
Region job credit 
programs 
Regional foreign 
investment offices 
Country dummies 
Adjusted R2 
-0.66  -0.49  -0.49 
(0.1  1)  (0.43)  (0.43) 
0.02  0.07  0.07 
(0.02)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
-  ,002 
-2.94 
( 1.42) 
-0.49 
(0.38) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
-  .002 
(.006) 
-2.94 
(1.25) 
-0.19 
(0.39) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
.004 
(.006) 
-0.63 
(0.38) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
-  ,009 
(.OW 
-3.21 
(1.22) 
-0.61 
(0.39) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
-  ,002 
(.006) 
-  3.09 
(1.24) 
19.2 
(6.05) 
-  16.  I 
(7.55) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
0.20  0.12  0.24  0.12 
Yes 
0.24 
Yes 
0.29 
Yes 
0.29 
-3.75 
(2.62) 
Yes 
0.26 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Regression constant terms not reported. Regional variables are calculated as average of region. Each regression 
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will exert a greater influence. In addition, the effects of apportionment may 
also be evident here. Payroll is one component of most states' apportionment 
formulas. As such, this weight factor should discourage firms from locating 
manufacturing  in  states with high corporate tax rates. The difference  in tax 
coefficients between the two samples are suggestive that these effects are op- 
erating. 
The second  interesting  distinction  in  the  manufacturing  subsample rein- 
forces the notion that the distribution of manufacturing employment is subject 
to different influences. Overall population was identified as the primary deter- 
minant of the changes in regional employment by  all foreign nonbank affili- 
ates. In the manufacturing subsample, population has a negative effect, if any. 
This is further evidence that manufacturing activities do not need to be located 
near customers while other operations do require proximity. At the same time, 
value added by state has a slight positive influence. This finding is potentially 
indicative of the presence of agglomeration economies in manufacturing. 
9.5.3  The Intraregional Employment Distribution of 
Manufacturing Affiliates 
Our examination now moves to the more disaggregated analysis of the distri- 
bution of employment between states within regions, where each state's em- 
ployment is compared with employment within its region, r. These results are 
presented in table 9.7. In portions of this table, identity of the foreign investor 
is used as a further discriminant to identify the effect of taxes on investment. 
The estimating equation takes the following form: 
Column ( 1) provides a benchmark. In considering the relative employment 
of different states within a region, value added in a state relative to other states 
in the region is a decisive factor. This factor is consistent with agglomeration 
stories of investment in which investment benefits from positive spillovers in 
either labor markets or in markets for intermediate inputs. This finding will not 
be discussed further since it is consistent throughout table 9.7. 
The relative corporate tax rate in column (I) exhibits no discernable effect 
on the distribution of manufacturing employment. However, as is explained in 
Hines (1996), the nationality of the investor has important implications for the 
effect of U.S. taxes on investment. Investors who are headquartered in exemp- 
tion countries pay no home-country taxes on their U.S. earnings. In compari- 
son, investors who are headquartered in foreign tax credit countries may have 
a smaller reduction in their after-all-tax profits as a result of high taxes paid to 
a U.S. state. It is not purely true that all foreign tax credit investors will be 
unaffected by  state tax differences. Firms that are in excess credit positions 
may not be able to use all their credits generated by state taxes. In this case 
higher taxes will deter investment by these firms, too. However, the result re- 
mains that exemption country investors should be more negatively influenced Table 9.7  Manufacturing Employment 
Dependent Variable: Employment Relative to Region 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Relative value added 
Relative population 
Relative corporate tax 
rate 
Relative corporate tax 
rate*exemption 
Relative pay 
Relative job credit 
program offer 
Relative job credit 
program offer* 
exemption 
Relative use tax 
Relative use tax* 
exemption 
N 
Adjusted R’ 
1.15  1.14 
(0.18)  (0.16) 
-0.3  I  -0.30 
(0.19)  (0.17) 
0.03  0.07 
(0.12)  (0.12) 
-0.93 
(0.09) 
1.16 
(0.18) 
-0.29 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.93 
(0.09) 
(0.43) 
-0.37 
1.15  1.16 
(0.17)  (0.16) 
-0.30  -0.29 
(0.19)  (0.17) 
0.032  0.7 I 
(0.12)  (0.13) 
-0.93 
(0.  I 1) 
-0.46 
(0.43) 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.03  -0.06 
1.17 
(0.16) 
-0.33 
(0.17) 
0.70 
(0.12) 
(0.09) 
-0.93 
1.17 
(0.1 6) 
-0.33 
(0.17) 
0.73 
(0.13) 
-0.96 
(0.11) 
0.04  0.01 
(0.03)  (0.05) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.36  0.50  0.50  0.38  0.5 1  0.50  0.50 
376  376  376  365  365  376  376 
Noret Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Regression constant terms not reported. 307  Effect of U.S. State Tax  and Investment Promotion Policy 
by US.  corporate taxes than the average investor who is governed by a foreign 
tax credit system. This hypothesis is tested in column (2)  through an interac- 
tion variable that multiplies the relative corporate tax rate variable by a dummy 
variable that indicates exemption investors. As predicted, the results show that 
corporate tax variation within a region has a strong negative effect on exemp- 
tion investors. 
The effect of the job credit program is tested in a similar fashion in regres- 
sions (4) and (5).  Job creation credits reduce state corporate taxes payable by 
firms. Therefore,  foreign  investors from exemption countries should derive 
equivalent, if not larger, benefits from job creation credits. Since these credits 
usually reduce  a firm’s state tax payments, it is expected that the job credit 
program variables will have the opposite sign of the corporate tax variables. 
The coefficient estimates on this interaction term are of the expected sign, but 
there are no significant effects, and the values of the credit to the two types of 
investors are not statistically distinguishable. 
Finally, in manufacturing, sales and use tax is a component that may increase 
the cost of investment. To  measure the effect of these sales and use taxes on 
the intraregional  distribution  of employment, regression  (6) adds a variable 
that measures  the  sales and use tax on manufacturing  inputs relative to the 
sales and use taxes applied to manufacturing inputs purchased by firms in other 
states of the region. No significant effect is found. However, the data present 
another opportunity  to test whether the earlier exemption distinction  was a 
spurious correlation that represented other characteristics of the exemption in- 
vestors. Column (7) adds a regressor that multiplies the relative sales and use 
tax variable by the exemption dummy. There should be no effect here since, 
unlike taxes on corporate income, sales and use taxes are not deductible by 
firms from foreign tax credit countries. In other words, sales and use taxes do 
not have differential effects on the overall tax payments of firms from exemp- 
tion as opposed to nonexemption countries. This spurious exemption variable 
has no measurable effect. This suggests that the earlier findings regarding the 
corporate tax reflect  differential  responsiveness  to corporate tax rates rather 
than unmeasured differences that separate the exemption from the foreign tax 
credit investors. 
As a second check on the robustness of the results, the regional groupings 
were changed to conform to the regional definitions presented by the Bureau 
of the Census. There were no discernable differences between the results pre- 
sented  in  table  9.7 and  the  results  generated  with  changes in  the  regional 
groupings. 
In  considering  intraregional  employment effects  in  manufacturing,  three 
conclusions emerge. First, the strong coefficients on value added as opposed 
to population  suggest that agglomeration  economies are one of the important 
factors determining the distribution of employment in manufacturing. Second, 
when corporate tax effects are measured among the set of countries that are 
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taxes appear to reduce employment in the states that have the highest taxes 
relative to their regions. Finally, the failure to find any correlation between the 
intraregional distribution of employment and sales and use taxes on manufac- 
turing  does not prove that these taxes have no effect. As table 9.4 showed, 
different regions center on different levels of sales and use tax on manufactur- 
ing equipment. Since this variable has a potentially strong effect on manufac- 
turing investment, states within regions mzy bring their taxes into conformity 
with  the rates that their neighbors  have. If  this occurs, no effect would  be 
found, since state policymakers have set their tax rates in a way that minimizes 
loss of employment to other states in their region, leaving inadequate variation 
within regions to identify any effects econometrically. 
9.6  Conclusions 
Our results suggest that the geographical distribution of foreign employment 
across U.S. states is in fact sensitive to both fiscal and labor market conditions 
in some but not all situations. The distinction that is of most relevance here is 
whether the foreign employment is in manufacturing or in the broader category 
of all nonbank affiliates. Both the interregional and the intraregional distribu- 
tion of foreign employment in manufacturing appear to respond to tax differ- 
ences. Regions whose taxes are higher than average for the country, or states 
whose taxes are high relative to their region, appear to deter investment. By 
way of contrast, the distribution of all nonbank employment does not appear 
to be sensitive to tax differences. This may reflect the activity mix of the two 
sectors. If the activity of nonmanufacturing firms in the nonbank affiliate cate- 
gory is directed toward functions such as sales and services, then these activi- 
ties need to be located in close proximity to final markets. This is consistent 
with the finding in this study that the broadly defined category of employment 
appears to be evenly distributed across regions in a fashion that corresponds 
to population. In contrast, the location of manufacturing is positively related 
to the current levels of business activities in states, as opposed to the popula- 
tions themselves. 
The differential tax sensitivity of these two types of employment suggests 
that fiscal policy oriented toward the more general investment levels is likely 
to be unsuccessful. The finding that foreign employment may in fact be more 
responsive to intraregional differences than to intranational differences has two 
implications for state policymakers. First, in crafting promotion policies, the 
most intense competition is found among one’s neighbors. Therefore, it is not 
necessary for states to copy actions that are taken by states in other regions. 
Second, some observers claim that in the international context it will be diffi- 
cult for nations to maintain high corporate tax rates when far lower tax rates 
are ‘offered by tax havens. These results suggest that firms’ real activities are 
not perfectly elastic in the face of fiscal differences. 
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by broad measures of corporate tax, the inclusion of other state promotion tools 
does not produce identifiable effects. One might suspect that we are unable to 
find measurable effects because these promotion policies are, for the most part, 
denoted by indicator variables that cannot capture the full degree of interstate 
heterogeneity that is present. A more serious problem is that the failure to mea- 
sure results on this front may very well be due to the fact that states’ use of 
investment promotion  tools  is endogenous. On the positive  side, attractive 
states may open investment promotion offices since they expect large invest- 
ments and these investment offices abroad help coordinate foreign firms’ plan- 
ning. On the negative side, states that have failed in the past may implement 
programs to augment employment. Here, the use of indicator variables for the 
programs will yield what appear to be negative effects. Yet another possibility 
is that no successful program will go without imitation. This possibility is ex- 
plored in Head et al. (1994) in the case of foreign trade zones. If this is the 
case, imitation removes the differentials in the explanatory variables that are 
needed to identify the effects of these programs. In order to identify the impact 
of these promotion variables, future research is needed to model and measure 
states’ use of promotion tools. 
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Comment  Michael Wasylenko 
At a lively debate some years ago on the elasticity of demand for money, one 
person challenged the group to name one controversial issue in economics that 
was resolved through empirical work. Each empirical researcher has his or her 
favorite examples, but most would agree that resolving issues takes replication 
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of results over several studies using a variety of data sets before one can speak 
confidently about the size and statistical significance of the coefficients. 
Through replication,  a strong consensus has recently emerged among re- 
searchers studying location decisions about the effect of state and local busi- 
ness taxes on plant locations. State and local taxes affect location decisions of 
manufacturers  but have less or even no impact on the location decisions of 
nonmanufacturing industries. Another consistent finding is that in the United 
States the smaller a region over which the location decision is made, the more 
likely it is that taxes and other fiscal variables will influence location decisions. 
Those empirical results suggest that intraregional business location decisions 
are more susceptible to the influences of fiscal variables than are interregional 
business location choices. 
The findings cited above seem to apply to domestic and foreign location 
decisions  in  the  United  States  (Wasylenko  1995; Ondrich  and  Wasylenko 
1993),  although there are many more studies of location decisions of domestic 
plants (or employment) than of specifically foreign plants (or employment). 
For manufacturing firms, the elasticity of employment or location with respect 
to business taxes appears to be between -0.5  and -0.8,  depending on the time 
period of the study, on whether employment or plants are used as the left-hand- 
side variable, and on whether aggregate or micro data are used in the analysis. 
Agglomeration economies, or plants locating in groups to take advantage of 
technological transfers, information, proximity to suppliers, or to a workforce, 
have consistently and strongly determined plant locations in empirical work. 
Put differently, regions with plants in a particular industry are likely to attract 
more plants in the same or a similar industry. 
The results reported in Deborah Swenson’s paper are roughly consistent with 
the results reported  in  other papers.  Her paper makes a contribution  to the 
literature on the location of  foreign direct investors. However, several points 
should be made about the data and the modeling used in her paper. 
Use of Aggregate versus Micro Data 
Total employment in foreign-owned plants, which is an aggregate of new 
plants,  plant  expansions,  mergers,  acquisitions,  equity  increases, joint ven- 
tures, and other direct investments, is explained in her paper. Investors typi- 
cally exercise more choice over where to locate new plants than they would 
over acquisitions of existing plants and other forms of investment. Therefore, 
findings on the variables that attract foreign investment to a state have typically 
been stronger when new plants or “greenfield” investments are analyzed than 
when other forms of investment are commingled with new plants in the analy- 
sis. Empirical results based on greenfield investments may describe what for- 
eign investors actively seek, while the results based on aggregate data describe 
what investors do when financial and other considerations enter the location 
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would want to know what investors actively seek in a location. Studies using 
aggregate data might then be less interesting to policymakers. 
Tax Variables 
While Swenson is careful to acknowledge and to account to the extent pos- 
sible for several of the complications  of the tax code as it applies to foreign 
investors, there are several points about the tax variables worth reemphasizing. 
Moreover, the measurement of  the tax variables is not pushed as far as one 
would like in her paper. 
Worldwide unitary taxation  was used  at one time or  another in 13 states 
during the  1980-87  period.  However, during that time period many of these 
states abandoned worldwide unitary taxation. These changes in the tax struc- 
ture might be important in the analysis of the  1980-87  time period, and her 
study does not take into account the nature of the unitary tax system in the 
states. After  1987, however, only five states used worldwide unitary taxation, 
and the changes in this policy were few and not influential. Thus, in the latter 
period of the study, the variation in the unitary tax structure among states may 
be differenced away in her estimation and not important in her analysis of the 
1987-92  period.  But in the earlier period  worldwide  unitary  taxation could 
have changed location decisions in the aggregate. 
Formulas that are used to apportion  corporate income among states vary 
among states. States do use the three-factor formula based on sales, payroll, 
and property; however, some states double weight the sales factor, while others 
allow firms to choose among several apportionment  formulas. Again, these 
variations might difference out of the model if states do not alter their appor- 
tionment formulas over the time periods.  If  apportionment  formulas change, 
however, they could influence the amount of manufacturing investment in the 
states. 
Moreover, states do not typically use the three-factor formula to apportion 
income in some nonmanufacturing industries, such as finance. This is not taken 
into account in her model and reasoning. 
Effective tax rates are preferred to nominal corporate tax rates as measures 
of tax burdens. In fact, one would like to have measures of marginal effective 
tax rates in states. Investment tax credits in New York State, for example, give 
New York a relatively low marginal effective tax rate, although the state’s nom- 
inal corporate tax rate is higher than average. In her paper, Swenson uses nomi- 
nal tax rates, which are likely to mismeasure the marginal tax rates of foreign 
investors. 
However, her analysis accounts for the different state tax circumstances that 
investors from different home countries face. She distinguishes between home- 
country  territorial  and residential  tax  systems, where  investors in territorial 
countries pay U.S. taxes and no taxes to their home country. An investor from 
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(upon repatriation of the income), unless he were in an excess credit position 
in his home country. 
Swenson accounts for some variation in the rate of manufacturing sales and 
use taxes. However, the administration of this tax complicates greatly the accu- 
rate measurement of the sales and use tax rate as it affects manufacturers. For 
example, Ohio exempts business machinery and equipment from sales taxes, 
but still 30 percent of all sales tax revenue in Ohio is derived from business 
purchases. The reason is that Ohio uses an administrative list approach, where 
a specific set of items is sales tax exempt, instead of granting a sales tax ex- 
emption to all material and equipment purchased by a firm (the integrated plant 
approach to levying the exemption). Thus, the findings in her papers that sales 
and use tax exemptions for business equipment do not influence locations may 
occur because investors are aware that the sales tax rate itself is a less important 
determinant of their sales tax burdens than is the administration of the tax. Put 
another way, there may be quite a bit of  measurement error in the sales tax 
exemption variable used in the paper. 
Fiscal Incentives 
A generic problem that affects all attempts to analyze the effects of fiscal 
incentives is measuring accurately the size of fiscal incentive packages or pro- 
grams. Swenson, for instance, attempts to account for whether a state has a 
foreign trade office in a country, but there are no easily available measures of 
the staffing and activity in the office. To emphasize this point, Japan has a 
Japanese  External  Trade  Organization  (JETRO) within  the  United  States. 
There are eight regional offices, each with a large staff to promote Japanese 
exports as well as to help small to medium-size U.S. businesses export to Ja- 
pan. Moreover, JETRO offices arrange exchange programs with universities in 
the United States for civil servants in Japanese ministries. This example high- 
lights the range of activities that an office in another country could undertake. 
More important, the size of each state’s foreign office in other countries is not 
measured in Swenson’s analysis. 
Similar arguments can be made for a host  of  fiscal incentive programs, 
which have typically limited participation to new firms or to small firm start- 
ups and made available everything from loan guarantees to direct loans. The 
wide variation in the formulation of fiscal incentives among states as well as 
the wide range of eligibility criteria for firms to qualify for the incentive pack- 
ages complicates the measurement of these incentive programs and makes it 
difficult to estimate their effectiveness. As a result, what we can say with con- 
fidence about the  effectiveness  of  these  programs is  limited. Moreover, as 
Swenson also notes, the presence of  fiscal incentive programs in themselves 
may be an attempt to compensate for inherent weaknesses in the business cli- 
mate of  a state (and thus endogenous to employment growth) rather than an 
exogenous source of employment growth. 314  Deborah L. Swenson 
Comments on Specific Regressions 
While she does not say so, I assume that a time effect was included as a 
variable when two different  time periods are pooled in the analysis. Carroll 
and Wasylenko (1994) have shown that fiscal variables have different effects 
over time because different levels of state competition in different time periods 
can drive state fiscal systems to look more similar over time. As fiscal variables 
become more alike among states, fiscal variables become more neutral as de- 
terminants of location. (This latter point is also made by Swenson.) 
It would be interesting to know the results of her model when it is run on all 
states without deflating the equations by their regional averages, as in table 9.7. 
By running all states (weighted appropriately by population to correct for the 
size of the state), one could learn about the sensitivity of the results when states 
are compared to averages within their respective regions relative to when states 
are simply pooled without comparisons to regional averages. 
In  summary, this  is a good paper. Nonetheless,  research  in this area has 
moved beyond aggregate analysis and has employed microlevel plant location 
data. Better measures of the fiscal variables would also help identify their ef- 
fectiveness with more accuracy. 
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